Broadcast authentication is a critical security service in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) 
Introduction
Wireless sensor network (WSNs) [1] consist of a large number of ultra-small, low-cost, low power autonomous sensor nodes. WSNs can be used for wide range of applications [2, 3, 4] . Security is a critical issue when sensor networks are deployed in a hostile environment where they are exposed to a variety of malicious attacks. In such a situation, an attacker can easily insert forged messages in wireless networking environment, therefore broadcast authentication is critical security service in wireless sensor networks. The high risk of physical attacks and the limited capabilities of sensor nodes make it difficult to apply traditional broadcast authentication schemes to wireless sensor networks [5] . Confidentiality, authenticity, availability, and integrity are typical security goals for WSNs [6, 7] . Broadcast authentication, enabling a base station to send authentic messages to multiple sensor nodes, is one of the challenges [8] .
Broadcast authentication allows a sender to broadcast messages to multiple nodes in an authentication way. In literatures for addressing broadcast authentication in WSNs, two categories are classified according to the cryptographic primitives employed. One of categories mainly focused on designing symmetric-key based broadcast authentication schemes. Typical examples are µTESLA [9] and its variant [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , which provide broadcast authentication by utilizing one-way chains and delayed disclosure of authentication keys. The other category of solutions achieves broadcast authentication through the use of public-key cryptosystems [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
Though employing public-key cryptography for implementing broadcast authentication in WSNs provides simple solutions, strong security resilience, good scalability and immediate message authentication, the signature verification is much slower than the message authentication code verification used in symmetric-key based solutions. Symmetric schemes and hash functions have lower computational requirements and are more widely used in sensor networks.
Selected Related work
Through implementation of public-key cryptosystems is feasible used in WSNs nowadays, it's still more expensive [20] than symmetric-key cryptosystems. More practically in this section, we briefly review the µTESLA [9] scheme and its multilevel variant [10, 11] . All these schemes are constructed without using public-key cryptography.
Broadcast authentication in WSNs was first addressed by µTESLA [9] . It is an extension of the TELAS [21] protocol tailored for sensor networks to reduce the computation overhead. In TELAS, the sender generates MAC (Message Authentication Code) with a symmetric key and reveals the key after a certain period of time. TELAS removes computational overheads of public-key operations from the digital signature based schemes. TESLA is efficient for broadcast authentication. It uses a digital signature and broadcasting to distribute key chain commitment securely but it may cause computational overheads in wireless sensor networks. µTESLA overcomes this by unicasting the key chain commitment to all the nodes. In µTESLA, a sender broadcasts a message with a MAC generated with a secrete key K i , which is disclosed after a certain period of time. When a sensor node gets this message, if it can ensure that the packet was sent before the key was disclosed, the sensor node buffers this packet and authenticates the packet when it later receives the disclosed key. Initially, sensor nodes first fix a public one-way function H and choose a random value K n , which is the secret hold by the sink. The one-way chain K i =H(K i+1 ) is iteratively calculated for all n>i≥0 and the last element K 0 , which is called the commitment of the key chain, is preinstalled in the sensor nodes. Thus, with the knowledge of the commitment K 0 a receiver can authenticate any key in the key chain by merely performing pseudo random function operations. µTESLA divides the time period for broadcast into multiple short intervals. During the i-th interval I i , the messages broadcast are sent with a MAC keyed with the same key K i . Because of the one-way property of the function H, given the key K j in the key chain, anybody can compute all the previous keys K i for j>i, but anybody can calculate K i for j<i, so it is easy to check the validity of any newly received K i with the commitment K 0 , or any other K j satisfying j<i.
The multi-level µTESLA [10, 11] technique is proposed to extend the capabilities µTESLA [9] . The basic idea of multi-levelµ TESLA is to construct a multi-level µTESLA structure, in which several levels of chain are used with each (except for the top) level consisting of multiple chains. The lowest level is a normal chain used for message broadcast and usually lasts for a relatively short period. Upper levels exist to authenticate their very next lower level chains. When the lowest level chain draws to an end, the second level chain is used to authenticate the commitment for the next lowest level chain to be used. The second level broadcasts CDM. To authenticate a new second level chain commitment, the third level is used, and so on. This extension enables the original µTESLA to cover a long time period and support a large number of sensor nodes. The top level is a single chain that has to last as long as the sensor network lifetime. Since CDMs are distributed with in a longer time interval, DoS attacks must be considered. Multilevel µTESLA provides two variants for this. One is the DoS tolerant version with a random selection method, requiring large node buffers to store multiple CDMs for each level. The other is the DoS resistant version, and uses a hashing technique adapted from TESLA's immediate authentication method.
Motivations
Though µTESLA is more efficient compared with other public key signature, the key chain length is limited, and it can not support broadcast for a long time. A simple solution to solve the distribution of key chain commitments in µTESLA is to pre-distribute the commitments. As a result, all the sensor nodes have to store the key chain commitments and other necessary parameters once they are initialized, and are ready to use µTESLA as long as the starting time is passed. However, this solution also introduces some problems. First, a key chain in this scheme can only cover a fixed period of time.
To cover a long period of time, we need either a long key chain, or a large interval to divide the time period. If a long key chain is used, the base station will have to pre-compute and store this key chain. In addition, the receivers will have to perform intensive computation of pseudo random function if there is a long delay (which covers a large number of intervals) between broadcast messages. If a long interval is used, there will be long delay before the authentication of a message after it received, and requires large buffer at the sensor nodes. Second, it is difficult to predict the starting time of a key chain when the sensor nodes are initialized. If the starting time is set too early, the sensor nodes will have to perform a large number of pseudo random function operation in order to authenticate the first broadcast message. In addition, the key chain must be fairly long so that it does not run out before the sensor nodes' life time ends. If the starting time is set too late, message broadcasted before it cannot be authenticated by µTESLA. Multi-level TESLA uses multilevel key chains to extend the lifetime of authentication broadcast. However, these techniques either use substantial bandwidth and storage, or require significant resources in the WSNs. Moreover, even though the use of multiple levels allows shortening of each chain, the total lifetime still has to be predefined.
Contributions and Organizations
In this paper, we propose an efficient scheme based on Tornado code to support a large sensor networks. The proposed scheme uses multiple short key chains, not multilevel key chain as in multilevel µTESLA. To minimize the communication overhead and again packet loss, we amortize the CDM over many small parts and use Tornado code to encode these small parts to tolerate packet loss.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief introduction about of Tornado code. Section 3 presents the development of our scheme. Section 4 describes the performances of our scheme, and section 5 concludes the paper.
Tornado code overview
The Tornado code is a Forward Error Correction (EFC) node, which introduced by Byers et al. [22] consists of several layers of bipartite graphs. In the leftmost graph, the left side nodes are called message nodes and correspond to the source symbols. A symbol is some predefined number of bits. All the remaining nodes are called check nodes and correspond to redundancy symbol. Tornado codes can encode and decode date in linear time and mainly have XOR operation, so it is suitable used in sensor network. In this section, we describe the mathematical tools that will be used in our scheme.
An example of a Tornado code structure with two layers nodes is illustrated in Fig.1 . Between the right side nodes and the left side nodes in each bipartite graph there exist edges, specifying how the right side nodes depend on the left side nodes. The degree of a node is equal to the number of edges connected to the node. The check nodes are calculated as the exclusive-OR of all the left side nodes in the bipartite graph with which the check nodes share edges. Decoding of a block is done using the following algorithm: "Give the value of check node and all but none of its message nodes, set the missing node to the XOR of the check node and all of the check nodes known message nodes". Tornado codes produce an n packet encoding from a m packet source. However, Tornado codes relax the decoding guarantee as follows: to reconstruct the source data, it is necessary to recover εm of the n encoding packets, where ε>1. We then say that εis the decoding inefficiency, which usually less than 1.06. The advantage of Tornado codes over standard codes is that Tornado codes trade off a small increase in decoding inefficiency for a substantial decrease in encoding and decoding times, thus making them far more attractive for large values of n and m. The Tornado decoding algorithm can detect when it has received enough encoding packets to reconstruct the original message. Thus, a client can perform decoding in real-time as the encoding packets arrive, and reconstruct the original message as soon as it determines the sufficiently many packets arrived. 
The proposed scheme 3.1 Overview of the proposed scheme
The basic idea in the proposed scheme is to use a series of key chains instead of using multilevel key chains as in multilevel µTESLA, and let the proceeding packets carry the commitments of the following key chains. As with other µTESLA-like schemes, the proposed scheme provides broadcast authentication, under the assumption that the base station and sensor nodes are loosely time synchronized with a known maximum synchronization discrepancy.
Let us divide time into intervals with indices <i, j> , i stands the i-th chains and j do intervals of the i-th chains. Intervals will be denoted as I i,j . We let K i,j denote the corresponding keys. When j=0, an indexed key is a commitment. For simplicity, it assumed that key chains are equal and the length of the key chain is L. For each i>0 and 0<j≤L, the chains are constructed by recursively setting Before the life time of the i-th key chain, the base station first constructs CDM i and fragments CDM i into m equal blocks CP i ={CP i,1 ,CP i,2 ,…,CP i,m }, then uses the given structure of a Tornado code to produce n blocks TP i ={TP i,1 ,TP i,2 ,…,TP i,n }, in which each blocks has a distinct index. The block TP i,k , 0<k≤n, will be carried successively in circles by the authenticating message sending during the life time of the i-th chain. That is TP i,1 will be put in the first packet, TP i,2 in the second packet, …TP i,n in the n-th packet, T 1,n+1 in the (n+1)-th packet, and so on.
The details of the proposed scheme 3.2.1 Initialization
We assume a base station broadcasts authenticated messages to sensor nodes. The base station generates the fist CDM 1 and then the initial parameters to the sensor nodes. When the initialized sensor nodes are deployed, they are to be loosely time synchronized with the base station, as assume in µTESLA [6] .
Broadcast Packets Generation.
During time interval I i,j , the base station uses the K i,j as the MAC key for the message being sent out, and reveals K ij after the time interval j+d , here d is the delay interval. We shall abuse interval and key indices, setting
. Hence, the broadcast packet has the following format.
)
Here, M denotes the broadcast message, TP i,r is the Tornado code block, r=j mod n and r=n, if j=n.
Broadcast Packets Verification
Assume that a senor node receives packets during working time of the i-th key chain. The sensor node first checks the security condition as in µTESLA. If the incoming packet satisfies the security condition, the receiver accepts the packet. Otherwise, the receiver simply drops it. Since the packet has been altered or is forged by an adversary. As soon as the sensor node receives a key of a previous time interval, the sensor node can authenticate the received packet as in [9] .
As the sensor nodes need to get the commitments of succeeding key chains, the sensor node also needs to decode the Tornado code in the received packets. There are three cases needed to be considered.
Case 1: The sensor node has more than (1+ε)m distinct authenticated Tornado code packets. The sensor node decodes Tornado code packet TP i,k and gets the CDM i . Then the sensor node keeps the data in the CDM i in its memory.
Case 2: The are more than (1+ε)m distinct Tornado code packets during the i-th key chain lifetime, but less than (1+ε)m distinct Tornado code packets have been authenticated. The sensor node decodes these Tornado code packets to get the i-th chain's Commitment Message CM i . If the sensor node has verified CMC i , the sensor node uses CMC i to verify CM i . If CM i has been authenticated, the sensor node keeps the CM i in its memory.
Case 3: The sensor node has no authenticated CMC i and less than (1+ε)m authenticated Tornado code packet at the end of the i-th chain lifetime. In this case, the receiver need to get parameter of the key chain from its' neighboring nodes.
Analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we derive the probability of establishing direct keys between neighbor sensor nodes and analyze the security issues for our proposed scheme. We also analyze storage requirement, communication overhead and computational overhead required for our scheme. In the following sections, we assume that each packet loss occurs independently with the probability p.
DoS attack resistance
It is generally held that µTESLA-like schemes have the following shortcomings that all the sensor nodes have to buffer all the messages received with one time interval. Since sensor nodes have to buffer and forward all the messages received within d time intervals, an adversary can hence flood the whole network arbitrarily. All he has to do is to claim that the messages belong to the current time interval which should be buffered and forwarded for authentication until next time interval. Note that in the µTESLA-like schemes, due to low bandwidth communication in sensor networks, the number of data packet buffered during d time intervals is usually small. Thus, in this paper, we only focus on the DoS attacks that target at disrupting the distribution of initial µTESLA parameters.
In the proposed scheme, the initial parameters of the following key chains are carried by the data packets in the life of the fore key chain. So our scheme is resistant to DoS attacks. In the multilevel µTESLA schemes, the usability of a low-level key chain depends on the authentication of the chain commitment contained in the corresponding CDM message. A sensor node cannot use the low-level key chain K i,0 for authentication before it can authenticate the K i,0 distributed in the CDM. This magnifies the thread of DoS attacks. An attacker may launch DoS attacks on the messages carrying the initial µTESLA parameters [7, 8] . Though several solutions have been proposed in [7] , they either use substantial bandwidth or require significant resources at the base station.
Robustness to packet loss
The instability of wireless communication makes it prone to lose packet. As a result, the protocol for sensor networks needs to own ability of robustness to packet loss. In the proposed scheme the CDM of following key chain are carried by the foregoing packets. So if there are many lost packets, the following key chain can't get its CDM. Although the sensor node can get CDM from its neighbor nodes, this will cost energy on communication and some broadcast packets can't get authentication before the sensor node acquire the key parameter and certificate of key chain. This is the additional price this scheme brought. If this case occurs too often, this will introduce more communication overhead. From the following analyses, we know that the probability of this case occurring is very small in sensor networks.
Let A i be the event that a sensor node has the authenticated fist key of the i-th key chain; let B i be the event that a sensor node receives more than (1+ε)m packets in the i-th key chain life time; let C i be the event that a sensor node has the authenticated parameter certificate of the i-th key chain. So we have
As the packet loss is independent and the probability of event B i in every key chain is equal. Then
Where ε is the decoding inefficiency of Tornado code p is the packet loss rate v is the broadcast packets sending rate s=[(L×I×v)/n], here [x] denotes the smallest integer not less than x. Theorem 1. The probability of the event
From the scheme description, we know that
Theorem 2. The probability of the event 
From scheme description, we know that if event A i happens, the authentication will last to the i-th key chain. Fig.2 shows the relationship between the probability of A i and the combination of running time and packet loss rate. Here, assuming that the broadcast packets sending rate v is 180/min, the interval duration I is 200 milliseconds, the size of Tornado code is one byte, the length of key chain is 600 in (a) and 800 in (b). As there is a lot of redundancy for each Tornado code packet, the proposed scheme can tolerate packet loss. From the Fig.2 (a) we can see that when the packet loss rate is less than 78%, the authentication will be last a long period of time. From Fig. 2 , we know that the longer the key chain is, the more robust the proposed scheme tolerate to packet loss. That is that the longer the key chain is, the more redundancy for each Tornado code packet will be. 
Efficiency Comparison
Now we compare multi-level µTESLA [10, 11] with our scheme and show that the requirement resources are different.
Comparison in Base Station
In multi-level µTESLA, the full chains which cover all of the expected lifetime and their CDMs in multi-level µTESLA have to be pre-computed and stored. In the proposed scheme, only a small number of short chains need to be stored in the base station, with the rest computed on the fly, and the chains are extendable indefinitely. By storing the pre-computed chain only in part, storage can be reduced.
Comparison in Sensor Nodes
We first compare the storage need in these two schemes. In the proposed scheme and multi-level µTESLA scheme, the new commitments for future chains need to be buffered and verified, but the proposed scheme requires less storage in the sensor nodes than multi-level µTESLA. In the multi-level µTESLA, verification of a level-l commitment must wait through level-(l+1)'s longer interval, and this situation worsens as we go up the levels, while in the proposed scheme the commitment of the chain has been verified in the life of the previous key chain or will be verified almost immediately. In the proposed scheme, a sensor node needs to store the two commitments and one CMC, adding up to a total three keys (taking 24bytes) at runtime. In comparison, an l-level µTESLA node needs to store 3l-2 keys, along with the buffered CDMs for each level except the highest level. Now we study the communication in these two schemes. In these two schemes, there are additional data to be sent besides the broadcast message. In the proposed scheme, each broadcasting packet only needs to carry the one Tornado code packet, usually one bytes long. While in multi-level µTESLA, only the lowest level is used for message broadcast, the rest levels are used to send the commitments of key chain.
Suppose there are l levels in the multi-level µTESLA scheme; the length of key chain of each level is L and the internal duration is I. In this case, the life time of this scheme is l×L×I and each node need to store the 3l-2 keys. With the given internal duration internal duration and the length of key chain, to extend the life time, it need either to have more level, longer key length or longer interval. The more levels, the more memory is needed in each sensor. Because the memory in sensor nodes is limited, the life time of broadcast authentication in multi-level µTESLA can't be last long. Whereas, in the proposed scheme, the life time of authentication scheme is independent of memory needed in sensor nodes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an efficient scheme based on µTESLA. In the proposed scheme, the length of every key chain and the time interval can be short, and the multiple chains can cover a long period of time. It is these properties that make it to pre-distribute the commitments practical, so it is well suitable to be used in large sensor network. By using Tornado code, each key chain can get its commitment in lossy channels. Since this scheme is based on µTESLA protocol, this scheme has the security properties in µTESLA, such as tolerance of message loss, etc. The analysis showed that the proposed scheme is more efficient the multilevel µTESLA. 
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